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Researchers  often  ﬁnd  it unsettling  that  domain  experts  sometimes  agree  and  sometimes  do  not.  This
paper  argues  that  previous  investigators  may  have  lacked  sufﬁcient  appreciation  of  domain  differences.
That  is,  task  characteristics  have  a major  impact  on  the  behavior  of  experts.
The purposes  of  this  paper  are:  (1) to review  empirical  evidence  on agreement/disagreement  by  experts
in various  domains,  (2)  to  outline  a commonly-accepted  conceptualization  that  questions  the  competence
of  experts  when  there  are  disagreements,  (3)  to relate  domain  differences  to  the  degree  of  agreement
between  experts,  (4)  to  suggest  an  alternate  conceptualization  of  expertise  that  views such differences
in  agreement/disagreement  as inevitable,  (5) to  look  at implications  of  this  conceptualization  for  future
directions  of research  on  expertise.
© 2015  Society  for Applied  Research  in Memory  and  Cognition.  Published  by Elsevier  Inc.  This  is an
 articopen  access
. Introduction
Several of the scholars in this special issue have devoted much,
f not all, of the careers to understanding the part that intuition
lays in judgment and decision making (JDM) generally and exper-
ise speciﬁcally. For instance, Klein conceptualizes intuition as “the
ay we translate our experience into action” (Klein, 2003, p. iv; see
lso Klein, 2015, and Hammond, 2015, in this collection of papers).
lmost by deﬁnition, experts are assumed to be superior decision
akers, in large part, because of their experience. (It is worth noting
hat expert and experience have the same Latin root.)
To the extent that experts in a particular domain have a common
ackground and shared experiences, e.g., in medicine or weather
orecasting, it seems likely that they would have developed similar
ntuitions and thus similar decisions. This suggests that empirical
tudies of experts in a domain should reveal high levels of agree-
ent between experts.
The goal here is to examine this conclusion. My  contention
s that agreement between experts is, in fact, expected in some
omains. However, I will also show that in other domains, disagree-
ent between experts is not only common, but also predictable
rom characteristics of those domains. The position taken here is
hat disagreement between experts should be expected depending
n the domains of expertise.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the connection between
he extent to which experts agree or disagree and their area of
∗ Tel.: +1 785 556 4891; fax: +1 785 532 5401.
E-mail address: shanteau@ksu.edu
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2015.07.003
211-3681/© 2015 Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Published by
reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).le under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-nd/4.0/).
domain specialty. The paper is organized into ﬁve sections. First,
there is a review of the literature on agreement/disagreement
between experts. Second, a commonly held view – that experts
must agree or be considered incompetent – is outlined. Third,
the role that domain differences play in agreement/disagreement
between expertise is considered. Fourth, an alternate perspective
is offered that posits that experts in many domains are likely to
disagree. Finally, the paper concludes with implications for future
research directions.1
1.1. Background
Since the start of systematic research on decision-making exper-
tise in the 1940’s, investigators have often expressed dismay at the
extent to which experts disagree. Moreover, such disagreements
have led to doubts about the claimed competence of experts. If two
experts are asked to assess the viability of a company, the expecta-
tion of most researchers is that they should make the same decision.
If they make different decisions, then we  wonder whether they are
as skilled as they claim.
In a seminal paper, Einhorn (1974) argued that consensus or
between-expert reliability is a necessary condition for expertise.
However, he reported signiﬁcant differences in diagnoses by three
expert medical pathologists. The average between-expert correla-
tion (r) was  .55 (where .0 is chance and 1.0 is perfect). Einhorn also
1 This paper is an extension of an earlier article on task characteristics (Shanteau,
1992) that has become my most widely cited publication according to ResearchGate
(30 Dec 2013 7:59), an online academic resource site.
 Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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xamined consistency or within-expert reliability over time, i.e.,
he extent to which one expert says the same thing in similar situ-
tions on different occasions. For pathologists, Einhorn reported a
ithin-expert consistency r of .50.
In comparison, weather forecasters have been reported to have
igh consensus values, r = .95, for short-term predictions. More-
ver, their internal consistency is near perfect, r = .98 (Stewart,
oebber, & Bosart, 1997). Thus, in two domains of expertise that
ave been frequently studied over the years – medical diagnosis
nd weather forecasting – there is conﬂicting evidence in the lit-
rature as to whether experts do, or do not, agree both with other
xperts and with themselves over time.
Initial research in my  laboratory focused on agricultural judg-
ents. In a study of four professional livestock judges, for instance,
xperts were asked to evaluate overall breeding quality of swine
Phelps, 1977). Despite a high level of internal consistency (average
 = .96), the consensus agreement was much lower, r = .50. Appar-
ntly, livestock experts have internally consistent strategies, but
hey do not agree with each other about what those strategies
hould be.
Similar analyses have been conducted for other types of agricul-
ural judgments. For instance, grain inspectors were found to have a
oderate consensus value between judges of r = .60, with compara-
le internal consistency average of r = .62 (Trumbo, Adams, Milner,
 Schipper, 1962).
In non-agricultural domains, the values are often lower. For
xample, Hoffman, Slovic, and Rorer (1968) and Goldberg and
erts (1966) reported consensus values of less than .40 for judg-
ents by professional stockbrokers and clinical psychologists. The
nternal consistency values were similar with correlations of just
ver .40.2
Several studies have explored whether between-expert consen-
us increases with experience. Ettenson, Shanteau, and Krogstad
1987) found that between-auditor correlations increased from .66
o .76 to .83, for students, audit seniors (mid-level), and full part-
ers, respectively. Messier (1983) reported comparable results –
udit partners with more than 15 years experience had greater
onsensus than partners with less experience (also, see Hamilton
 Wright, 1982).
These results suggest three conclusions: First, experts in various
omains sometimes agree, but often disagree; the consensus corre-
ations range from .40 to .60. Second, some experts in domains such
s weather forecasters show higher levels of agreement, with r val-
es up to .95. Finally, for nearly all domains, the internal consistency
alues are higher than the between-expert consensus values.
Based on this background, a contrast can be made between two
erspectives on disagreements between experts: At one extreme
s the view that experts should agree and any disagreement sug-
ests something wrong about the qualiﬁcations of one or more
xperts (or all). At the other extreme is the view that disagreements
etween experts should not be surprising; instead, they are a reﬂec-
ion of the normal state of affairs in many domains. The paper will
ow turn to a more detailed examination of each perspective.
. Experts-should-agree perspectiveThe less-than-impressive consensus correlations in most stud-
es of expertise led many researchers to question the abilities of
xperts in general. Following Einhorn’s logic, these investigators
2 Most of the studies reporting consensus and consistency values were conducted
etween 1970 and 2000. Relatively few studies of experts in the new millennium
ave reported such values. Hence, the literature cited in this paper is, of neces-
ity, somewhat dated. Nonetheless, the values reported for speciﬁc domains have
emained more-or-less constant over the years, e.g., see the studies of auditing
xpertise (Ashton, 1974; Messier, 1983; Shanteau, 1993).mory and Cognition 4 (2015) 169–175
assumed that agreement is a necessary condition for expertise. The
lack of agreement, therefore, suggests “experts are no damn good”
(Gettys, personal communication, 1980). This interpretation of reli-
ability data apparently derived from an implicit ﬁve-part argument
about experts:
(1) For tasks performed by experts, there is assumed to be a sin-
gle “gold standard” or unique “ground truth.” When this truth is
readily accessible, anyone can obtain it directly, e.g., from books
or computer programs. For expert tasks, however, the truth is
outside the realm of common knowledge. That is why  we need
experts.
(2) Because of their special skills and experience, experts are
uniquely qualiﬁed to tell us about this “ground truth.” That is,
experts can determine what others cannot determine.
(3) Since by deﬁnition there can be only one “ground truth,” all
experts should give us a single correct answer. The special abil-
ities of experts thus allow them to make the same decision.
(4) If experts disagree, then someone is wrong—they cannot all
be correct. Some (or all) of them must not real experts. Thus,
disagreement is a reﬂection of incompetence.
(5) Since lay people do not know which so-called “experts” are cor-
rect when there is disagreement, the only safe course of action
is to distrust all (or most) of them. Thus, lack of consensus
between experts implies that we should be suspicious of their
claimed special abilities.
This argument, of course, is not a formal chain of logic. However,
it is implicit in the way that many researchers have interpreted
evidence of disagreements between experts.
3. Domain differences
It is common knowledge that experts in different domains per-
form different tasks. Yet, decision researchers persist in treating
all experts alike, so that the term “expert” is used generically. For
instance, Kahneman (1991, p. 1165) concluded, “there is much evi-
dence that experts in general are not immune to the cognitive illusions
that affect other people.” This may  be true in some domains, e.g.,
medical diagnosis (Jacavone & Dostal, 1992). But in other domains,
such as weather forecasters, e.g., Murphy & Winkler (1977), experts
show little sign of biases or “cognitive illusions.” Thus, despite the
generalizations drawn about experts, there are well-known excep-
tions to the rule.
In an earlier effort to account for these domain differences, I
constructed a table to differentiate between those domains where
experts do well and those where experts do not (Shanteau, 1992).
The left and right columns in the earlier table represented domains
where good or superior performances have been reported in the lit-
erature. It has since become clear that a dichotomy is overly simplis-
tic and that a more reﬁned view is needed. Therefore, an updated
version of the table is presented in Table 1, with four columns.
The table is based on a continuum from high to low competence.
In the left column are those domains e.g., weather forecasting,
where experts make aided decisions using Decision Support Sys-
tems (DSS) or other computerized tools. The next column contains
domains, e.g., livestock judges, where experts make skilled, but
largely unaided decisions. The third column lists domains where
experts, e.g., clinical psychologists, show limited competence. In
the last column, the behavior of experts, e.g., stockbrokers, is close
to random.There are many ways to describe the differences in this table.
For present purposes, it is sufﬁcient to observe that domains to the
left (more competent) side involve stable (static) properties. That is,
the stimuli and the problem “hold still” for experts to evaluate. The
J. Shanteau / Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 169–175 171
Table  1
Progression of domains from high to low performance.
Highest levels of performance Lowest levels of performance
Aided decisions Competent Restricted Random
Weather forecasters Livestock judges Clinical psychologists Stockbrokers
Auditors Grain inspectors Pathologists Polygraphers
Test  pilots Chess masters Parole ofﬁcers Ofﬁce managers
Insurance analysts Photo interpreters Student admissions Parole ofﬁcers
Physicists Soil judges Intelligence analysts Court judges
Note: Each domain was classiﬁed based on analyses of expert performance reported in the literature.
Table 2
Reliability correlations (consensus vs internal consistency) for experts.
Highest levels of performance Lowest levels of performance
Aided decisions Competent Restricted Random
Weather forecasters1 Livestock judges2 Clinical psychologists3 Stockbrokers4
r = .95/.98 r = .50/.96 r = .40/.44 r = .32/<.40
Auditors5 Grain inspectors6 Medical pathologists7 Polygraphers8
r = .76/.90 r = .60/.62 r = .55/.50 r = .33/.91
Note 1: First (left-side) value is Consensus Correlation and second (right-side) value is Internal Consistency Correlation.
Note  2: Values cited drawn from following sources:
1 Stewart et al. (1997).
2 Phelps and Shanteau (1978).
3 Goldberg and Werts (1966).
4 Slovic (1969).
5 Kida (1980).
6 Trumbo et al. (1962).
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omains to the right (less competent) side involve more changeable
dynamic) properties. Thus, the stimuli and problem are less stable,
arder to specify—more like “moving targets.”
Another way to view this distinction is to note that most
omains to the left side of the table involve physical or natural
roperties, whereas the domains to the right involve behavioral
roperties. This may  reﬂect the fact that scientiﬁc advances have
 longer history of development in left-side domains. In contrast,
he domains to the right have relatively young scientiﬁc histories.
iven this difference, it makes sense that expert competence will
e higher to the left side and lower to the right side.
Based on personal correspondence, other investigators offered
arious insights into this table. For instance, Dawes (personal com-
unication, 1987) observed that predictability differs for the two
ides of Table 1: human behavior is inherently less predictable than
hysical stimuli. Dawes further commented that, paradoxically,
ublic expectations vary inversely with inherent predictability.
hat is, in the less predictable behavioral domains, e.g., clinical
sychology, any errors by experts are highlighted. In contrast, in
he more predictable physical domains, e.g., weather forecasters,
xperts are expected to make occasional mistakes.
Gigerenzer (personal communication, 1989) offered an insight-
ul observation by noting that historically most left-side domains
egan as right-side domains. As understanding of meteorology
dvanced, for instance, weather forecasting shifted from relying on
ut feelings and guesswork to use of detailed climatic information.
ith the advancement of science, therefore, many unstructured
ight-side domains have become structured left-side domains.
This interpretation was supported by an argument advanced
y Edwards (personal communication, 1991). He pointed out the
idespread use of decision or computer aids for left-side tasks, but
he absence of such aids for right-side tasks. Often these aids are for-
alized, such as the use of complex statistical algorithms to assist
eather forecasters (e.g., Cessna, Colburn, & Bewley, 2008). In other
omains, the aids are more informal, such as the written records
ept by livestock judges (Phelps, 1977) to help reduce hindsightbiases (Fischhoff, 2003). As Edwards and von Winterfeldt (1986)
observed, the “unaided expert may  be an oxymoron since competent
experts will adopt whatever aids are needed to assist their decision
making.”
Hammond (personal communication, 2003) observed that
left-side domains tend to be repetitive—similar conditions arise
from time to time. Right-side tasks, in contrast, are more
changeable—conditions frequently differ. This has implications for
the opportunity to receive feedback. With domains on the left, there
are more chances to learn from past decisions. Based on past suc-
cesses and failures, an expert can improve his/her judgments. With
right-side domains, however, there are fewer chances to obtain
such feedback.
4. Evidence
An important question is whether this distinction between
domains is predictive of different levels of agreement. To examine
this proposition, Table 2 summarizes correlation values from stud-
ies of experts across a variety of domains. Two domains are shown
in each column, with between-expert agreement (consensus) given
as average correlations, along with average within-expert agree-
ment (consistency) values. As can be seen, the mean consensus
r-value for weather forecasters is .95, whereas the average value
for livestock judges is .50. The consensus values for clinical psy-
chologists, and stock forecasters are .40, and .32, respectively.
Comparable results for other domains appear in the second line. The
trend supports the prediction outlined above—better-structured
physical domains lead to high consensus values and less structured
behavioral domains lead to less consensus.
The trends for within-expert reliability (consistency) correla-
tions are similar, with better-structured domains leading to higher
internal consistency. As expected, the consistency values (except
for pathologists) are higher than the corresponding consensus val-
ues. In two  domains (livestock judges and polygraphers), there are
172 J. Shanteau / Journal of Applied Research in Me
Table 3
Characteristics associated with good and poor performance in experts (adapted from
Shanteau, 1992).
Property
Characteristic Good performance Poor performance
Stimulus stability Static Dynamic
Type of decision Physical system Behavioral system
Experts agree on cues? Yes No
Domain context Predictable Unpredictable
Errors in decision making Tolerated Not tolerated
Repetitive tasks? Yes No
Outcome feedback? Available Unavailable
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Use of decision aids? Routine Not Routine
otable discrepancies between consensus and consistency corre-
ations. These apparently reﬂect the existence of different “schools
f thought” about how experts should do their jobs in these ﬁelds
Gaeth & Shanteau, 1984).
. Domain characteristics
One question arising from this table is: What do the domains
n each column have in common? My  original answer (Shanteau,
992) was that domains with competent performance involved
tatic objects or things. That is, experts were asked to make judg-
ents about stimuli that were relatively constant, so that judges
ere faced with stationary targets. In contrast, domains with poor
erformance involved dynamic stimuli, generally involving human
ehavior. Because these experts were evaluating what was, in
ffect, a moving target, they did less well.
An updating of this description is offered in Table 3, which
escribes nine domain characteristics that seem to inﬂuence
hether the performance of experts is good or not. As can be
een, these characteristics range from Stimulus Stability (Static vs
ynamic Stimulus domains), to Domain Context (Predictable vs
npredictable Contexts), to Problem Decomposition (Yes vs No),
nd Use of Decision Aids (Routine vs Not Routine).
This list was compiled from my  own observations, my  reading
f the literature on experts, as well as from comments by Ward
dwards, Gerd Gigerenzer, Robyn Dawes, Ken Hammond, and Gary
lein. While certainly not complete, the table is a start of an effort
o compile a list of the task characteristics that underlie whether
xperts are likely to perform well or not in a domain. Put another
ay, such characteristics may  help deﬁne the range of high-to-low
erformance possible by an expert within a given domain.
. Decision researchers’ view of experts
Investigators in artiﬁcial intelligence, expert system design, cog-
itive science, systems analysis, and computer science have all
ssumed that experts are superior decision makers. That is why
nowledge engineers build computer simulations around what
xperts know. Similarly, most domain-speciﬁc researchers (such
s in medicine and weather forecasting) view experts as possessing
nique information essential for making good decisions. In short,
nvestigators in these disciplines see human expertise as something
o be emulated.
In contrast, many decision researchers have concluded that
xperts are ﬂawed and prone to making simple errors (e.g.,
ahneman, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Moreover, experts
nd novices are viewed as sharing the same shortcomings. For
nstance, Tversky (quoted in Gardner, 1985, p. 360) stated, “when-
ver there is a simple error that most laymen fall for, there is always
 slightly more sophisticated version of the same problem that experts
all for.”mory and Cognition 4 (2015) 169–175
Decision researchers have apparently overlooked the existence
of domain differences between areas of expertise. For instance, both
weather forecasters and livestock judges are skilled professionals.
Yet, there is a major difference for these two ﬁelds in the level
of disagreement between experts. The former is based on a well-
developed science (Murphy & Winkler, 1977), whereas the latter is
based more on “informed judgment” (Shanteau, 1999). It should not
be surprising, therefore, to ﬁnd livestock experts disagreeing more
with each other about their judgments than weather forecasters.
7. Importance of domains
The position taken here is that many decision researchers
adopted the experts-should-agree perspective of expertise. As
argued above, this view implies that disagreement between experts
is a sign that something is wrong. Moreover, that leads to the con-
clusion that experts are not as skilled or as competent as they claim
to be. In this section, I will propose an alternative perspective based
on a domain-sensitive view of expert performance. This perspective
is based on a ﬁve-part argument:
(1) The primary job of an expert is not to make decisions but to help
clients reach a broadly deﬁned target state. For example, the
goal may  be to help policy makers design better management
strategies or to increase the proﬁt potential of a product line.
These goals do not involve single answers, but instead require
something more elaborate from the expert, such as a strategic
plan.
(2) To reach the client’s goal requires dealing with multiple, con-
stantly changing, and dynamic factors. The situations faced by
experts are different and more complex than the simpliﬁed sit-
uations considered by many researchers. Thus, experts work on
problems that are much more complicated than those studied
in idealized settings.
(3) Using their knowledge and experience, the role of the expert
is to recognize patterns and ﬁnd consistencies in a dynamic
problem space (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 2010).
The expert’s job is to clarify the issues for the client. In other
words, the challenge for an expert is “to make sense out of chaos.”
(4) Based on their experience and insights into the nature of prob-
lems, experts try to help clients clarify their thinking. Typically,
an expert will often identify various alternate paths to the
desired goal states. The expert’s role is to lay out the options
and the consequences in a clear and comprehensible fashion
for others.
(5) In the end, it is the client, not the expert, who actually makes
most decisions. The expert offers insights and observations, but
it is up to others to make and implement the ﬁnal choice(s).
Thus, the ﬁnal responsibility for the decision rests on the client,
not the expert.
The view is nicely summarized by the management consult-
ant Golde (1969, p. 213), “we  seem to expect too much and the
wrong things of our experts.” That is, experts generally act more
like knowledgeable consultants. Rarely do they function as the
“all-knowing, single-answer decision makers” envisioned by many
decision researchers.
When experts disagree, therefore, it is because they often see
alternative paths to the client’s goal state. In turn, savvy clients
may  seek out the views of various experts precisely because they
want different perspectives on their problems. Thus, disagreements
between experts are not only expected, but may  actually be useful
to those who hire them.
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. Implications
By relying on a belief in consensus, many researchers have
nknowingly adopted a limited view that leads them to expect that
xperts should always agree. The next section looks further at the
mplications arising from this distortion.
.1. Economic/statistical thinking
By drawing a parallel to economic/statistical theory (Gigerenzer,
993), decision researchers have adopted a “single correct answer”
pproach to assessing experts. In most quantitative assessments,
e expect to ﬁnd one and only answer to a question. When an
xpert (or anyone else) gives an answer different from the “correct
nswer,” he/she is said to have a “bias” (Kahneman, 2012). More-
ver, when two or more experts give different answers, their claim
f special competence is questioned (Hartelius, 2011).
The position here is that these researchers have relied on an
verly simpliﬁed view of how experts function. For instance, the
nvironment in which experts work is much different from that
eﬂected in the idealized world envisioned by these researchers.
roblems rarely are simple enough to lead to single correct answers.
nstead, there are multiple answers (or at least multiple routes to
nswers). If so, it should not be surprising to ﬁnd that experts, espe-
ially in domains involving human behavior, often take different
pproaches to ﬁnding answers.
The underlying issue is that researchers often misunderstand
hat experts do and what is expected of them. These investigators
eem to think that experts see the world as they do – with simpli-
ying assumptions and single-answer solutions. However, experts
enerally have a different worldview—with many complexities and
ontingencies, but with few optimal solutions (Shanteau, 1989;
hanteau et al., 2002).
From the present perspective, therefore, disagreements
etween experts are expected. Although researchers view dis-
greements as evidence of incompetence, my  view is that experts
ee disagreements as a more-or-less inevitable part of their job.
.2. Research opportunities
There are at least two fruitful directions for future research on
ow task characteristics impact expert performance:
First, as illustrated by Shanteau and Thomas (2001), the rela-
ionship between cues/stimuli in the environment can make a
ramatic difference on performance levels. To demonstrate, they
xamined various decision rules across environments whose cue
orrelations varied from positive to neutral to negative. Using 5,000
nvironmental simulations, they found that the performance of a
ultiattribute-Utility (MAU) strategy (Stillwell, Seaver, & Edwards,
981) varied from 96% accuracy in a positively-correlated environ-
ent to 90% in a neutral (zero-correlation) environment to 84% in
 negatively-correlated environment. In the context studied, the
AU  strategy provides an optimal economic solution, which can
e viewed as what experts might strive for.
This result emphasizes the importance of the correlational
tructure in evaluating performance of experts. The performance
f the same strategy dropped from 96% to 84% because of the cor-
elational structure of the cues. This 12% decrease could be the
ifference between labeling an expert “competent” or “incompe-
ent,” depending on the domain. Yet, the strategy followed was
xactly the same.
In positively-correlated environments it is possible to ﬁnd
lternatives with high values on all cue attributes. For example,
hen considering job candidates, it may  be important to consider
chool grades and scores on standardized tests. According to Dawes
1994), these two attributes are positively correlated in the realmory and Cognition 4 (2015) 169–175 173
world. Shanteau and Thomas (2001) labeled positively-correlated
environments as “friendly,” since it is easy to maximize decision
outcomes (for a follow-up to this idea, see Hogarth & Kolev, 2013).
By selecting a job candidate with high test scores, you also get high
grades and vice versa. Thus, it is hard to make a bad decision in a
positively-correlated environment not matter what the skill level
of the decision maker.
However, negatively-correlated environments are “unfriendly”
in that no options exist where values are high on all attributes.
Such environments arise when resources are limited, as they very
often are. Thus, the decision maker is forced to accept a loss on
one attribute in order to obtain a gain on another. Decision mak-
ers must assess tradeoffs between attributes, such that as one
attribute gets better, other attributes get worse. Experts often work
in negatively correlated settings such that no alternative exists that
simultaneously maximizes all attributes. There are no wars with-
out casualties; or as McClelland (1978) argues, “there are no free
lunches.”
As an example of how the stimulus environment can inﬂu-
ence expert performance, consider weather forecasts. In places like
Southern California, weather changes from day to day are relatively
rare. Thus, a forecast of “some clouds in the morning giving way to
mainly sunny skies for the afternoon” (the actual forecast for March
14, 2014) is likely to be accurate—and uninformative, since the
same forecast applies most of the time. In contrast, forecasts for
Washington, DC vary widely from day to day (the March 13, 2014
forecast, “windy with sunshine, with occasional gusts over 40 mph”).
Thus, two  weather forecasters with the same skill level are likely
to have difference performance levels, depending on whether they
live in Southern California or Washington, DC.
McClelland (1978) showed that negatively-correlated envi-
ronments result whenever non-dominated alternatives are
considered—regardless of the cue correlations. For example, mar-
ket forces can lead to elimination of dominated alternatives from
a consumer choice set (Johnson, Meyer, & Ghose, 1989). However,
Johnson, et al., found no evidence that consumers switch strate-
gies in response to changes in inter-cue correlations. An interesting
question is whether experts are any better at detecting correlations
between stimulus attributes.
The second fruitful direction for research involves efforts to
assess expert performance. It has been argued, “if you cannot mea-
sure it, then it is not science” (Lord Kelvin, 1889). Following this
dictum, one of the keys to advancing the “science of expertise” will
be to develop methods for measuring performance. One candidate
for such a method is the Cochran–Weiss–Shanteau (CWS) index.
This is based on the proposition that expert performance must
satisfy two necessary, but not sufﬁcient, conditions. The ﬁrst is
that experts must have the ability to discriminate among stimuli
within a domain. The ability to differentiate between similar, but
not identical, stimuli is a hallmark of expertise (Hammond, 1996).
The second proposition, following Einhorn (1974), is that experts
must be internally consistent, i.e., they agree with themselves over
time. Taken together, discrimination and consistency can be com-
bined following a formulation [developed by Cochran (1943) for a
different context] such that,
CWS  Index = Discrimination
Consistency
It is relatively simple to satisfy one or the other. For example,
discrimination can be achieved by saying everything is different,
even if they are similar. And consistency can be achieved by say-
ing everything is the same, even if they are different. However, to
achieve both discrimination and consistency requires a tradeoff.
A major advantage of this particular approach, and measure-
ment in general, is that assessments of expertise are tied directly
to the behavior of the experts. That is, the CWS  index combines
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wo readily observed properties of expert judgment. The numerator
nd denominator can be estimated using variances or other meas-
res of variability. Examples computations are shown in Weiss and
hanteau (2003). A version of CWS  for nominal data is also included
n that paper.
Given the variety of applications of CWS  in recent years, the
uestion is not whether CWS  is able to provide useful assessments
f expert performance—it clearly can (Barlett, Vowels, Raacke, &
hanteau, 2008; Weiss & Shanteau, in press; Williams, Haslam, &
eiss, 2008; Witteman, Weiss, & Metzmacher, 2012). Rather, the
uestion is whether CWS  can be applied to provide insights into
omain differences in the performance of experts. Since CWS  offers
n approach to measuring expert performance, the challenge is to
ssess how performance varies across different domains and tasks.
. Final comments
To conclude this paper, let me  suggest three ﬁnal comments.
First, I believe that the superiority of experts depends on their
bility to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information.
his view is supported in many studies (Danziger, Levav, & Avnaim-
esso, 2011; Englich, Mussweller, & Strack, 2006; McGuigan, 2012;
say & Jung, 2013). One goal in future research should be to deter-
ine how experts learn to make these discriminations and to ﬁnd
ays to enhance that process. Some recent developments using
eural scanning and eye movements of experts may  be of value
n this effort (Inglis & Alcock, 2010; Roberts, Anderson, & Husain,
010; Wright, Gobet, Chassy, & Ramchandani, 2013).
A second goal should be to understand the kinds of intellectual
nd physical tools used by experts to enhance their judgments.
xperts seldom, if ever, make unaided judgments of the sort
mphasized in laboratory research. In fact, researchers make use of
he very tools denied their subjects. “The experimenters themselves,
sing tools and expertise, are able to perform (laboratory) tasks rather
ell” (Edwards, 1983, p. 511). The type of tools used by experts
eeds to be better understood (Mamede et al., 2010; Williamson,
itchell, Hitch, & Baddeley, 2010). Perhaps it will be possible to
orrow some of the tools used in the left-side domains in Table 1
o assist those on the right side.
The ﬁnal goal should be to develop insights into domain differ-
nces. According to Edwards (1983, p. 512), “we have no choice but
o develop a taxonomy of intellectual tasks themselves. Only with
he aid of such a taxonomy can we think with reasonable sophis-
ication about how to identify among the myriad types of experts
nd the myriad types of tasks. . . just exactly what kinds of people
nd tasks deserve our attention.” The analyses in the present tables
ffer a start in building such a taxonomy.
Research on such goals will help broaden our understanding
f expertise. In contrast, concern about the supposed incompe-
ence of experts offers little opportunity for expanding insights
nto expertise. Instead, we should focus our efforts on analyses of
elevance/irrelevance, tool usage, and domain differences.
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